Great piece! I debated an ethicist on the ethics of Santa here https://youtu.be/1Nc8L_O01RM?si=Mpt_k--o4o6OfcUY I’m inclined to think systemically lying to children about Santa is usually morally OK, on the grounds that *most* children - though your daughter might be an exception - will retroactively consent to the lie (in the way a passerby would consent to a street magician lying to her about there being nothing up his sleeve, on the grounds that the lie was well-intentioned allowed her to enjoy the magic more. If there’s nothing wrong with street magic, I don’t think there’s anything wrong with the Santa myth.)
Amos, thanks so much! I'm going to check out your debate with the ethicist asap. (I should clarify that my son Calder is male, though that may not be relevant here.) I'm intrigued enough by the idea of retroactive consent that won't throw a bunch of limit-case, reductio-ad-absurdum counterexamples out, though in the street-magician scenario it seems pretty clear that consent is given upfront rather than retrospectively, unless the mark is unaware that said person IS a street magician. But thanks again!
Oops—mixed your son up with your sister! Hope neither of them minded! 😅
On the magician analogy: I guess the case I was picturing was one where the spectator knows the magician is a magician (and therefore knows that the magician isn’t being truthful if he claims the trick was real magic), but still believes a number of assertions made in the course of the trick (“I’ll roll up my sleeves—nothing in them”, etc.) that the magician *intends* for the spectator to believe. (And telling S some claim, in the belief that it’s false, with the intent that S believe it, is more or less the definition of lying.) I was also imagining—since the magician is a street magician, and not a stage performer you’d pay to see—that the onlooker hasn’t consented to being lied to.
In that case, as stipulated, the lie seems intuitively permissible. Had the magician approached the onlooker after, confessed the specific lie, and asked if they thought it was wrong, they’d almost certainly say: “No! It helped me enjoy the magic! I’m fine with you having lied!” So long as children are very likely—in retrospect—to have the same attitude about Santa (perhaps not at the moment of finding out, but a while on when their thinking has crystallised and the dust has settled) the same moral considerations apply: lying to them was OK because—in expectation—you had good reason to think (based on anecdotal evidence from the parents and children you know) that they’d retrospectively consent to the lie, and think being deceived was worth it for the sake of the magic.
Great piece! I debated an ethicist on the ethics of Santa here https://youtu.be/1Nc8L_O01RM?si=Mpt_k--o4o6OfcUY I’m inclined to think systemically lying to children about Santa is usually morally OK, on the grounds that *most* children - though your daughter might be an exception - will retroactively consent to the lie (in the way a passerby would consent to a street magician lying to her about there being nothing up his sleeve, on the grounds that the lie was well-intentioned allowed her to enjoy the magic more. If there’s nothing wrong with street magic, I don’t think there’s anything wrong with the Santa myth.)
Amos, thanks so much! I'm going to check out your debate with the ethicist asap. (I should clarify that my son Calder is male, though that may not be relevant here.) I'm intrigued enough by the idea of retroactive consent that won't throw a bunch of limit-case, reductio-ad-absurdum counterexamples out, though in the street-magician scenario it seems pretty clear that consent is given upfront rather than retrospectively, unless the mark is unaware that said person IS a street magician. But thanks again!
Oops—mixed your son up with your sister! Hope neither of them minded! 😅
On the magician analogy: I guess the case I was picturing was one where the spectator knows the magician is a magician (and therefore knows that the magician isn’t being truthful if he claims the trick was real magic), but still believes a number of assertions made in the course of the trick (“I’ll roll up my sleeves—nothing in them”, etc.) that the magician *intends* for the spectator to believe. (And telling S some claim, in the belief that it’s false, with the intent that S believe it, is more or less the definition of lying.) I was also imagining—since the magician is a street magician, and not a stage performer you’d pay to see—that the onlooker hasn’t consented to being lied to.
In that case, as stipulated, the lie seems intuitively permissible. Had the magician approached the onlooker after, confessed the specific lie, and asked if they thought it was wrong, they’d almost certainly say: “No! It helped me enjoy the magic! I’m fine with you having lied!” So long as children are very likely—in retrospect—to have the same attitude about Santa (perhaps not at the moment of finding out, but a while on when their thinking has crystallised and the dust has settled) the same moral considerations apply: lying to them was OK because—in expectation—you had good reason to think (based on anecdotal evidence from the parents and children you know) that they’d retrospectively consent to the lie, and think being deceived was worth it for the sake of the magic.
White Santa aint about to come down No Nigga's Chimney. (Dick Gregory)